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INTRODUCTION 
 
War is gendered in its causes and consequences.1 
This dissertation proposes to look at whether and to what extent one can view sexual exploitation and abuse 
(SEA) by peacekeepers through the lens of Women, Peace and Security (WPS), and whether WPS might be 
used to address SEA – it is, after all, deeply rooted within the very issues of gender and power dynamics that 
WPS aims to solve. In order to analyse this possibility, chapter one provides an assessment of the existing UN 
framework on SEA, the way it was developed in silo and always in reaction to various crises, as well as what 
perception of SEA it puts forward. Chapter two then dives into an in-depth look of two of WPS' pillars, 
participation and protection, and the ways in which they could be extended to address SEA by peacekeepers. 
Participation comes first: after an overview of this pillar in WPS broadly speaking, the focus is on participation 
of women in UN peace operations. This particular aspect of participation appears to be a gateway to protection: 
this allows us to segue into the third chapter on protection, arguably the dominant pillar of WPS, and its various 
modalities. Of particular interest here are protection via the development of new roles in WPS, and protection 
via accountability for SEA. The fourth and final chapter analyses the question of peacekeeper babies, a key 
issue under the SEA framework that does seems to not quite fall under the remit of WPS. 
Discussion of WPS and SEA was made possible in the first place by the rise of international attention to sexual 
and gender-based violence (SGBV). SGBV has gone hand-in-hand with military operations virtually since the 
dawn of time. There has been a shift in perception over time, from rape as an inevitable consequence of conflict, 
the victims of which are deemed collateral damage, to a weapon of war that can be wielded to cause terror or 
political repression.2 When it was first internationally addressed, briefly, in the aftermath of World War II, it was 
spoken of in terms of an attack on a woman's honour3 or in reference to her capacity as a (potential) mother.4 
It took close to fifty years and the conflicts in the Balkans and Rwanda in the 1990s for sexual violence to 
                                                          
1 Claire Duncansson, Gender and Peacebuilding, Polity, 2016, 1. 
2 Claire-Elise Peron, "Comprendre le viol de guerre (1/6) – L'histoire des violences sexualles liées aux conflits: du 
dommage collatéral à l'arme de guerre", https://www.notaweaponofwar.org/comprendre-le-viol-de-guerre-1-6-
lhistoire-des-violences-sexuelles-liees-aux-conflits-du-dommage-collateral-a-un-outil-strategique/#pll_switcher, 15 
February 2019, accessed 23 August 2019. 
3 International Committee of the Red Cross, Geneva Convention IV Concerning the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time 
of War (Fourth Geneva Convention), 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 287, art. 27. 
4 Ibid, art. 38, 98, 132. 
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become a standalone issue of interest to the international community. The statutes of the international criminal 
tribunals set up to try and address the violations committed over the course of both crises explicitly included, 
for the first time, rape as a crime against humanity.5 This was followed by the inclusion of SGBV as a crime 
before the International Criminal Court,6 then by the acknowledgement that it may constitute genocide in certain 
scenarios.7 Rape and other forms of SGBV can also amount to torture and cruel, inhumane or degrading 
treatment (CIDT). This is, for the most part, on a different level than SEA, but is worth mentioning nonetheless 
as it helped create a favourable environment for discussions on SEA by peacekeepers to occur. 
Per its Charter (UNC), the UN's purpose is to "maintain international peace and security".8 There are different 
ways for it to do so: conflict prevention and mediation, also known as preventive diplomacy; peacemaking; 
peacekeeping; peacebuilding; peace enforcement. The 1992 Agenda for Peace provides the definitions for the 
first four, in a UN context, that are still used today: "Preventive diplomacy is action to prevent disputes from 
arising between parties, to prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflicts and to limit the spread of the 
latter when they occur. Peacemaking is action to bring hostile parties to agreement, essentially through such 
peaceful means as those foreseen in Chapter VI of the Charter of the United Nations. Peacekeeping is the 
deployment of a United Nations presence in the field, hitherto with the consent of all the parties concerned, 
normally involving United Nations military and/or police personnel and frequently civilians as well. Peacekeeping 
is a technique that expands the possibilities for both the prevention of conflict and the making of peace".9 
Peacebuilding is "action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in 
order to avoid a relapse into conflict".10 Finally, peace enforcement entails the permission to use force granted 
by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) under Chapter VII of the Charter. 
While the definitions may seem clear in theory, the distinctions are hazy in practice. Furthermore, it is uncommon 
for a UN mission mandate to include just one type of activity. For this reason, the all-encompassing term peace 
operation is preferred. It will be the term used in this analysis, and is to be understood broadly as covering any 
                                                          
5 UNSC, Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 25 May 1993, art. 5(g); UNSC, Statute 
of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, 08 November 1994, art. 3(g). 
6 UNGA, Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (last amended 2010), 17 July 1998, ISBN No. 92-9227-227-6, 
art. 7(1)(g), 8(2)(b)(xxii), 8(2)(e)(vi). 
7 ICTR, The Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu (Trial Judgement), ICTR-96-4-T, 02 September 1998. 
8 UN, Charter of the United Nations, 24 October 1945, 1 UNTS XVI, art. 1. 
9 UNGA, An Agenda for Peace: resolution / adopted by the General Assembly, 18 December 1992, A/RES/47/120 A, §20. 
10 Ibid, §21. 
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and all of the above. Personnel, whether military, police, or civilian, engaged in peace operations will be broadly 
referred to as peacekeepers, even if not deployed in a peacekeeping mission stricto sensu. 
The missions of UN peacekeepers have grown to include protecting and promoting human rights, as well as 
assisting in restoring the rule of law. They are to safeguard and embody the principles of the UN at all times, 
especially in their interactions with people in the field, whom they are there to protect. These tend to be persons 
in situations of acute vulnerability due to the context in which they find themselves. For this reason, SEA by 
peacekeepers truly is "a crime of the highest order; it is an extreme form of abuse of power against vulnerable 
and marginalised individuals carried out by those brought in to protect those very populations".11 The UN has, 
over the course of the past fifteen years, developed a framework to address SEA, but it remains rather lacklustre. 
Near-parallel to the SEA response framework, the UN developed the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) 
architecture. WPS consists of nine UNSC resolutions issued over the course of the last two decades: resolutions 
1325,12 1820,13 1888,14 1889,15 1960,16 2106,17 2122,18 2242,19 and 2467.20 Of these resolutions, 1820, 1888, 
1960 and 2106 focus exclusively on SGBV, whereas the others look at broader issues of WPS. The aim of 
these resolutions is to mainstream gender in UN peace-building processes. They address a number of issues 
summarily divided into the following categories, or pillars: participation, protection, prevention, and relief and 
recovery.21  
                                                          
11 REDRESS, Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in Peacekeeping Operations. Improving Victims' Access to Reparation, 
Support and Assistance, September 2017, 4. 
12 UNSC, Security Council resolution 1325 (2000) [on women and peace and security], 31 October 2000, S/RES/1325 
(2000).  
13 UNSC, Security Council resolution 1820 (2008) [on acts of sexual violence against civilians in armed conflicts], 19 June 
2008, S/RES/1820 (2008).  
14 UNSC, Security Council resolution 1888 (2009) [on acts of sexual violence against civilians in armed conflicts], 30 
September 2009. 
15 UNSC, Security Council resolution 1889 (2009) [on women and peace and security], 05 October 2009, S/RES/1889 
(2009). 
16 UNSC, Security Council resolution 1960 (2010) [on women and peace and security], 16 December 2010, S/RES/1960 
(2010). 
17 UNSC, Security Council resolution 2106 (2013) [on sexual violence in armed conflict], 24 June 2013, S/RES/2106 
(2013). 
18 UNSC, Security Council resolution 2122 (2013) [on women and peace and security], 18 October 2013, S/RES/2122 
(2013). 
19 UNSC, Security Council resolution 2242 (2015) [on women and peace and security], 13 October 2015, S/RES/2242 
(2015). 
20 UNSC, Security Council resolution 2467 (2019) [on women and peace and security: sexual violence in conflict], 23 April 
2019, S/RES/2467 (2019). 
21 UN Strategic Results Framework on Women, Peace and Security: 2011-2020, July 2011. 
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CHAPTER ONE: Existing UN responses to sexual exploitation and abuse by peacekeepers 
Sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA) by UN peacekeepers is a recurring topic of WPS (1.1). The reciprocal, 
however, is not true, despite these frameworks developing in parallel, along with other UN architectures (1.2). 
This may be explained by the fact that the UN's SEA policy developed in very specific circumstances (1.3). 
Likely as a result of the above, the UN appears to have an individualised understanding of SEA (1.4). 
1.1. Explicit mentions of sexual exploitation and abuse in Women, Peace and Security resolutions 
The creation of WPS benefitted from decades of women's advocacy, though it particularly built upon the Beijing 
Declaration and Platform for Action, which was adopted unanimously in 1995 at the end of the Fourth World 
Conference on Women: Action for Equality, Development and Peace. The Beijing Declaration's area of concern 
include, among others, women and armed conflict,22 women in power and decision-making,23 and institutional 
mechanisms for the advancement of women,24 thus laying out a foundation for WPS to piggyback off of. WPS 
and the Declaration mutually reinforce one another;25 the relationship between the two might therefore be 
described as symbiotic.  
In WPS, four of the nine resolutions make explicit reference to SEA by peacekeepers: 
- S/RES/1820, "Requests the Secretary-General to continue and strengthen efforts to implement the 
policy of zero tolerance of sexual exploitation and abuse in United Nations peacekeeping operations; 
and urges troop and police contributing countries to take appropriate preventative action, including pre-
deployment and in-theater awareness training, and other action to ensure full accountability in cases of 
such conduct involving their personnel;"26 
- S/RES/1888 reiterates the same wording exactly;27 
- S/RES/1960, "Requests the Secretary-General to continue and strengthen efforts to implement the 
policy of zero tolerance on sexual exploitation and abuse by United Nations peacekeeping and 
humanitarian personnel, and further requests the Secretary-General to continue to provide and deploy 
guidance on addressing sexual violence for predeployment and inductive training of military and police 
                                                          
22 131-149. 
23 181-195. 
24 196-209. 
25 UN Women, Peace Operations Training Institute, "Implementation of the UN Security Council Resolutions on the 
Women, Peace, and Security Agenda in Asia and the Pacific", 2014. 
26 S/RES/1820 (2008), §7. 
27 S/RES/1888 (2009), §21.  
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personnel, and to assist missions in developing situation-specific procedures to address sexual violence 
at the field level and to ensure that technical support is provided to troop and police contributing 
countries in order to include guidance for military and police personnel on addressing sexual violence 
in predeployment and induction training;"28 
The above provisions are, unsurprisingly, contained in WPS resolutions on SGBV. The latest mention to date 
of SEA by peacekeepers, however, is found in S/RES/2242, which provides as follows: 
"9. Expresses deep concern over continuing allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse by United Nations 
peacekeepers and non-United Nations forces, including military, civilian and police personnel, urges police- and 
troop-contributing countries to provide robust pre-deployment training on sexual exploitation and abuse and 
vetting of their peacekeeping personnel, to conduct swift and thorough investigations of their uniformed 
personnel and, if appropriate, to prosecute and to inform the United Nations in a timely manner of the status 
and outcome of investigations, calls upon the United Nations to cooperate as appropriate and in a timely manner 
with national authorities, including courts responsible for investigating such allegations, when requested for that 
purpose, and requests United Nations troop- and police-contributing country meeting to address sexual 
exploitation and abuse whenever relevant and the United Nations Military Staff Committee to discuss these 
issues as part of its regular programme; 
10. Welcomes the Secretary-General's continued efforts at implementing his policy of zero tolerance of 
misconduct, in particular the wide ranging proposals on prevention, enforcement and remedial action which 
promote greater accountability, including his commitment to bring to public light misconduct by United Nations 
personnel, as well as his proposal to keep the Security Council informed of developments regarding 
implementation of his zero tolerance policy on sexual exploitation and abuse, and his decision that all countries 
repeatedly listed in the annexes of his reports on Children and Armed Conflict and Sexual Violence in Conflict 
are prohibited from participating in United Nations peacekeeping operations, and urges those troop- and police-
contributing countries that are currently listed to cease such violations and implement action plans expeditiously, 
thereby avoiding suspension from peace operations, further requests the Secretary-General to include a section 
                                                          
28 S/RES/1960 (2010), §16. 
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on conduct and discipline including, whenever relevant, adherence to his zero tolerance policy on sexual 
exploitation and abuse, in all his reports on country-specific situations to the Security Council".29  
Interestingly, S/RES/2242's main focus is not SGBV but the participation of women in counter-terrorist policies: 
it explicitly links WPS and counter-terrorism,30 making it stand out in comparison with the other WPS resolutions. 
This makes the inclusion above provisions even more note-worthy, especially considering that they make up 
the most comprehensive approach to SEA in all WPS resolutions. The language in S/RES/2242 is much 
stronger and more detailed than that used in the previous three cases, in particular regarding what is expected 
of troop- and police-contributing States. It also mentions the steps undertaken by the UNSG to address SEA, 
such as the "policy of zero tolerance of misconduct", or its naming and shaming approach, thereby placing SEA 
policy under the purview of WPS. Similarly, the mention of the Children and Armed Conflict (CaAC) agenda 
makes it clear that, at least from a WPS perspective, SEA by peacekeepers is a cross-cutting issue. 
1.2. Women, Peace and Security and other relevant frameworks 
Parallel to the birth and development of WPS, the UN established other frameworks. Of particular interest in 
light of this analysis are the Protection of Civilians (POC) agenda, and the Children and Armed Conflict (CaAC) 
agenda: some of the issues these agendas address are cross-cutting and can be found in WPS as well. All 
three of these architectures, as well as the UN's human rights framework more broadly, are "more explicitly 
intersectional and human rights-based than SEA policy".31 It is therefore worth providing an overview of the 
ways in which the other architectures interoperate with WPS as they could be equally beneficial in improving 
implementation of SEA policy on the ground.32 However, the focus of this analysis remains WPS: the others will 
therefore only be looked at where directly relevant to WPS.  
POC is the result of normative shift in 1999, when the Security Council first authorised a peacekeeping mission 
"to afford protection to civilians under imminent threat of physical violence" in Sierra Leone.33 This inclusion is 
the result of "dark period for UN peacekeeping" in the 1990s, over the course of which the UN was unable or 
failed to address violence against civilians, particularly during the genocide in Rwanda, Srebrenica massacre, 
                                                          
29 S/RES/2242 (2015), §9, 10. 
30 S/RES/2242 (2015), §11-15 
31 Oxford Handbook of WPS, 232. 
32 For instance, see AIDS-Free World's Code Blue campaign advocating for SEA by peacekeepers to be viewed through 
the lens of the human rights framework. 
33 UNSC, Security Council resolution 1270 (1999) [on establishment of the UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL)], 22 
October 1999, S/RES/1270 (1999), §14. 
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and crisis in Somalia.34 The POC agenda's focus, per its name, is protection, which is also one of the pillars of 
WPS. These agendas are interlinked and have been from the inception of WPS. S/RES/1325 mentions the UN's 
concern for "civilians, particularly for women and children";35 it then flips matters around and speaks of "the 
protection of women and girls, especially as civilians",36 therefore linking the POC and WPS agendas from all 
aspects of the question. From the perspective of POC, the interconnectedness is less obvious: "POC has 
primarily meant the authorisation to use force at the tactical level to protect civilians under imminent threat of 
physical violence within the mission's area of deployment. As such, it is a gender-neutral concept".37 However, 
analysis of "the way protection is discussed in the Security Council meetings suggest that it is a gendered 
concept in the sense that 'innocent civilians' is often taken to mean 'women and children'". Furthermore, the 
mandates of UN peacekeeping missions, for instance those of the UN Organisation Stabilisation Mission in the 
DRC (MONUSCO) and UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), include a 
much more gendered understanding of protection, all of which point to WPS directly influencing the POC 
agenda.38 
As with the first POC resolution, the UNSC also issued the first of its eleven resolutions on CaAC in 1999,39 
though UNGA had already begun discussions on the matter in1996.40 WPS and the CaAC agenda are 
interconnected in a similar manner to WPS and POC. CaAC resolutions include a focus on gender, most notably 
resolution 1314 which predates resolution 1325 by about two months and called upon regional and subregional 
organisations to "Integrate a gender perspective into all policies, programmes and projects".41 Other than this, 
CaAC resolutions mostly integrate issues of gender through the lens of SGBV and/or conflict-related sexual 
violence (CRSV), which WPS does as well.42 As for WPS, it includes multiple references to children/child 
(mentioned 55 times over nine resolutions), girls (mentioned 81 times), and, on a few occasions, most of them 
                                                          
34 Lisa Hultman, Angela Muvumba Sellström, "WPS and Protection of Civilians" in Sara E. Davies, Jacqui True (ed.), The 
Oxford Handbook of Women, Peace and Security, Oxford University Press, 2019, 226., 599. 
35 S/RES/1325 (2000), 1. 
36 Ibid, §9. 
37 Oxford Handbook of WPS, 600. 
38 Idem. 
39 UNSC, Security Council resolution 1261 (1999) [on children in armed conflicts], 25 August 1999, S/RES/1261 (1999). 
40 UNGA, Impact of armed conflict on children: note / by the Secretary-General, 26 August 1996, A/51/306. 
41 UNSC, Security Council resolution 1314 (2000) [on the protection of children in situations of armed conflict], 11 August 
2000, S/RES/1314 (2000), §16(e).  
42 Katrina Lee-Koo, "WPS, Children, and Armed Conflict" in Oxford Handbook of WPS, 613.  
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recent, boys (mentioned 7 times). Much like POC, mentions of children in WPS generally fall under the 
protection pillar, though some are included in the relief and recovery pillar. 43  
The CaAC agenda gradually shifted towards gender neutral language; "after 2004 there are no specific 
references to girls as uniquely or particularly vulnerable groups of children in conflict. Indicative of this, 
subsequent resolutions which 'condemn rape and other forms of sexual violence' do so not against women 
and/or girls but 'against children' (emphasis added)".44 By contrast, WPS tends to group women and 
children/girls together, even in its most recent resolutions; feminist scholars have criticised this as an "old 
paternalist position that equates women and children – to the extent of running them together or combining 
them such that [...] they are seen as a single entity".45 While the focus of this analysis is how in-silo development 
has affected the UN's zero-tolerance policy on SEA, it is worth noting that the in-silo development of other 
frameworks also impacts WPS: the inclusion of items in its mandate that are already covered by other UN 
agendas can be argued to be detrimental to WPS's efficiency. In the case of children, CaAC also happens to 
have a much stronger institutional framework than WPS, and can therefore ensure better compliance with its 
resolutions.46 One might then argue that children who fall under the purview of WPS and CaAC is especially 
problematic: if the issue is already addressed elsewhere, any WPS resources allocated for this purpose might 
be better used to deal with one of the other items included in its extensive mandate. 
The matter of WPS lumping women and children together is worth addressing here, independent of the CaAC 
agenda. For an agenda that aims and claims to provide support for women's empowerment, constantly likening 
them to children is decidedly not a good place to start: at best, this infantilises women; at worst, it leads to the 
perception that they "have no agency, skill or, potentially, moral right to engage in public sphere activity [...]".47 
Either way, feminist scholars argue that this "has reinforced exclusionary practices that have culminated in 
women's absence from global peace and security activities and supported the overwhelming emphasis shown 
in the WPS agenda upon protection over participation",48 something that this dissertation looks into in further 
detail in the section on protection. There is something deeply counterintuitive to the framework set up to ensure 
                                                          
43 For example, S/RES/1889 (2009), §7. 
44 Oxford Handbook of WPS, 613. 
45 Erica Burman, "Beyond 'Women vs. Children' or 'WomenandChildren': Engendering Childhood and Reformulating 
Motherhood" in The International Journal of Children's Rights, vol. 16, no. 2, 01 January 2008, 177-194, 180. 
46 Oxford Handbook of WPS, 611. 
47 Oxford Handbook of WPS, 614. 
48 Idem. 
16 
 
women's empowerment and better their current situation actually bolstering the clearly biased in favour of men 
status quo.  
1.3. UN responses to sexual exploitation and abuse: constant reaction 
The issue of SEA first came to light with the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), "when the number 
of prostitutes in Cambodia rose from 6,000 before the mission to more than 25,000 in 1993".49 Addressing the 
root causes of SEA in order to prevent it from happening, or holding peacekeepers who engaged in such 
behaviour accountable, was not on the agenda at the time: the UN's response – sending condoms to limit the 
spread of HIV and asking peacekeepers to avoid visiting brothels in uniform50 – demonstrates an intention to 
sweep things under the carpet and not much else. Further scandals occurred in the following years, among 
which allegations of peacekeepers frequenting brothels in Bosnia and Herzegovina which were a front for sex 
trafficking in 1995; widespread SEA in Liberian, Sierra Leonean and Guinean refugee camps between 1999 
and 2002.    
Rising negative public attention eventually prompted an institutional response. First, in 2002, the Office of 
Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) investigated the situation in West Africa. The report of the OIOS to the 
Secretary-General (UNSG) was then published in a General Assembly (UNGA) resolution,51 in which the 
Secretary-General declared that "Sexual exploitation and abuse by humanitarian staff cannot be tolerated. It 
violates everything the United Nations stands for".52 UNGA adopted a resolution of its own soon afterwards,53 
"emphasi[sing] the need to create an environment free of sexual exploitation and abuse in humanitarian 
crises",54 asking that procedures of reporting and investigating be put in place, and calling for perpetrators to 
be brought to justice. The resolution also made addressing SEA the Secretary-General's prerogative by 
requesting that he "maintain data on investigations into sexual exploitation and related offences, irrespective of 
                                                          
49 Jasmine Kim-Westendorf, Louise Searle, "Sexual exploitation and abuse in peace operations: trends, policy responses 
and future directions" in International Affairs, vol. 93, issue 2, 01 March 2017, 365-387, 366. 
50 Idem. 
51 UNGA, Investigation into sexual exploitation of refugees by aid workers in West Africa: Note by the Secretary-General, 
11 October 2002, A/57/465. 
52 Idem, 1. 
53 UNGA, Investigation into sexual exploitation of refugees by aid workers in West Africa: Resolution adopted by the 
General Assembly, 22 May 2003, A/RES/57/306. 
54 Ibid, §4. 
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age and gender, by humanitarian and peacekeeping personnel, and all relevant actions taken thereon",55 and 
that he issue a bulletin on the matter.56 
The Secretariat issued said bulletin, also known as the 'zero tolerance policy', on October 15th, 2003;57 it entered 
into force on the same day. It defines sexual exploitation as "any actual or attempted abuse of a position of 
vulnerability, differential power, or trust, for sexual purposes, including, but not limited to, profiting monetarily, 
socially or politically from the sexual exploitation of another".58 Sexual abuse is "the actual or threatened physical 
intrusion of a sexual nature, whether by force or under unequal or coercive conditions".59 The bulletin then goes 
on to detail specific prohibited behaviours, such as sexual activity with minors, or exchanging "money, goods or 
services for sex".60 Mission leadership is in charge of holding perpetrators accountable, though the bulletin does 
not specify precisely how that is to be done beyond mentioning that "appropriate measures" ought to be taken, 
among which summary dismissal is such a measure. 
The bulletin did not lead to the problem disappearing. The UN faced further allegations of SEA in Burundi and 
the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in its immediate aftermath, leading the OIOS to admit, in 2005, the 
existence of a "pattern of sexual exploitation by peacekeepers" in DRC.61 The express acknowledgement of the 
issue, in those terms, has led some scholars to describe it as a "turning point in the UN Department of 
Peacekeeping Operations' (DPKO) response to allegations of sexual misconduct involving its personnel".62 The 
UNSG issued a report of his own (the Zeid report) in response to the situation in DRC per the request of the 
Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations.63 It provides a comprehensive strategy to eliminate future 
SEA by focusing on four main areas: "rules on standards of conduct; the investigative process; organisational, 
managerial and command responsibility; and individual disciplinary, financial, and criminal accountability".64 
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These examples show that the UN's approach to SEA is, overwhelmingly, one that focuses on investigation of 
individual conduct, which is a point this analysis will return to in further detail later. 
Yet despite a substantial list of policy documents aiming to address the issue, the framework remains mostly 
inefficient. SEA by peacekeepers made the headlines again in 2007, this time in UN Stabilisation Mission in 
Haiti (MINUSTAH). Over ten percent of the Sri Lankan contingent, the third largest troop-contributing country 
(TCC) to MINUSTAH, was implicated in allegations of SEA, a significant amount of which involved minors.65 
In 2010, the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) undertook a global review66 of SEA policy implementation 
since the situation in refugee camps in West Africa. Its conclusions were unforgiving: policy development had 
"not translated into managerial and staff understanding of these policies", particularly in the field; implementation 
was "patchy, poor or non-existent"; and, critically, there was a visible lack of senior management leadership 
promotion of existing policies despite them being accountable for implementation.67 No significant change came 
from this report in its immediate aftermath; though disappointing, this does not come as a surprise in light of the 
historical precedent presented here. 
In 2015, it was discovered that peacekeepers deployed in Central African Republic (CAR) and in Haiti had 
sexually abused children aged 8-15 in exchange for food and/or money. This time, the cause for scandal was 
not so much the events that had occurred in the field, but rather the way the UN dealt with and appeared to 
cover them up: "information [...] was passed from desk to desk, inbox to inbox, across multiple UN offices, with 
no one willing to take responsibility to address the serious human rights violations. Staff [...] focused on protocols 
rather than action. The welfare of the victims and the accountability of the perpetrators appeared to be an 
afterthought, if considered at all. Overall, the response of the UN was fragmented and bureaucratic".68 
Furthermore, the UN only began addressing the issue in 2015, well after human rights officers had first raised 
the alarm, in spring 2014, regarding the conduct of peacekeepers. It is no surprise that this was described as 
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"a gross institutional failure",69 especially as the UN's policy response to SEA was, at least on paper, well 
established by then. 
Some scholars argue that these events caused a shift in approach to SEA, mostly in light of the UNSG's 
declarations on the situation in CAR, wherein he declared TCCs "squarely" responsible for ensuring justice.70  
However, it is this author's belief that calling this a shift is overstating the matter. Scholars made similar claims 
in 2005 following the response to the situation in Burundi and DRC, yet it did not lead to any changes in practice. 
Therein lays the crux of the issue: all of these declarations, though invaluable, have hardly led to people on the 
ground being better protected against SEA by peacekeepers. When António Guterres was appointed new 
UNSG, he spoke of working on "structural, legal and operational measures to make the zero-tolerance policy 
[...] a reality",71 thereby illustrating the still-theoretical nature of the policy despite over a decade of work – and 
despite two years having passed since the CAR crisis.  
What emerges from the above analysis is the consistent reactive rather than proactive development of UN SEA 
policy. This may, in part, explain its continued lack of effectiveness in practice, particularly from an 
implementation perspective.  
1.4. The UN's individualised understanding of sexual exploitation and abuse 
SEA policy developing in isolation may be another explanation for its ineffectiveness.  Indeed, what is striking 
about the UN's response to SEA is the way it appears to have been developed in isolation, with little to no regard 
for other existing UN frameworks developed in parallel mentioned in 1.2.  
Despite other architectures highlighting the interconnectedness of the issue, developments in SEA policy 
continued to occur mostly in silo. The adoption of S/RES/2272,72 for example, is interesting in this regard: it is 
an SEA-focused resolution that exists outside all the frameworks described above, yet with clear links to them. 
It provides for the repatriation of peacekeeping military or police units where there is "credible evidence of 
widespread or systematic" SEA by said units;73 here, there are similarities to the content of S/RES/2242 
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regarding the UNSG's power to suspend contingents engaging in SEA from peace operations. It goes on to 
draw even more explicit links between the various frameworks, concluding that "appropriate United Nations 
mechanisms, including those related to Children and Armed Conflict, Women, Peace and Security, and the 
Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights [should] continue to include allegations of sexual exploitation 
and abuse in their regular reporting to the Secretary-General".74 The fact, then, that these links are ignored from 
an operational standpoint makes no sense. 
There is a parallel to be drawn between the development of policy responses to SEA in isolation and the fact 
that these policy responses "reflect an individualised understanding of SEA".75 Determining which causes the 
other is a case of whether the chicken came before the egg or vice versa and does not much serve our purpose: 
whatever the degree of causality, it is undeniable that on the one hand, SEA policy was consistently developed 
in a bubble, in response to UN peacekeepers committing these acts, and on the other, that SEA was long 
perceived as a problem unrelated to broader issues of gender. 
There exists an inaccurate underlying assumption that troop-contributing countries that send personnel to peace 
operations do so with some great moral objective in mind. The corollary of this notion is that peacekeepers are 
inherently above committing SEA and that when they do, the issue is one of a few 'bad apples'.76 Official UN 
documents have very explicitly embraced this mindset. The Zeid report, for instance, which is the cornerstone 
of the UN's SEA framework and continues to shape it to this day, opens with the following statement: "United 
Nations peacekeeping operations have for decades brought peace and stability to countries emerging from war. 
The women and men who serve the blue flag do so under arduous and often dangerous conditions. The history 
of peacekeeping has been one of distinguished collective accomplishment and personal sacrifice. However, 
this exemplary record has been clouded by the unconscionable conduct of a few individuals" (emphasis 
added).77 Other scholars, on the contrary, have argued that "the root of the problem is that peacekeepers are 
fully aware of the power disparities, and use these disparities and their relative positions of power of vulnerable 
local populations to their advantage to perpetrate the abuses".78 
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The UN's philosophy, which rejects the latter approach in favour of the former, explains why most of its SEA 
policies focus on targeting "individual compliance primarily through standards of conduct, recruitment standards 
and training, and threats of punishment".79 We will return to the modalities of this response in more detail later.  
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CHAPTER TWO: Addressing sexual exploitation and abuse by peacekeepers via the participation 
pillar 
This chapter first looks at the way WPS defines, perceives, and promotes participation (2.1). It then spotlights 
a particular aspect of participation, that of women in peace operations (2.2), which proves to be a way to ensure 
better protection (2.3). 
2.1. Participation in Women, Peace and Security: general remarks 
Participation, per the 2011 Strategic Results Framework, means that "Women participate equally with men and 
gender equality is promoted in peace and security decision-making processes at national, local, regional and 
international levels".80 This idea is rooted in the fact that women represent over half of the world's population 
and should be equally involved in such processes. The insistence on women's participation at all levels 
nationally is especially important if we are to use WPS to address SEA, given TCCs' responsibility for holding 
peacekeepers accountable. 
Participation is presented as a way to guarantee the other WPS pillars. S/RES/1325 speaks of "the important 
role of women in the prevention and resolution of conflicts and in peacebuilding",81 as does S/RES/1820;82 
S/RES/1889 of their "vital role in the prevention and resolution of conflict and peacebuilding" and of the "key 
role women can play in re-establishing the fabric of recovering society".83 The underlying rationale is that the 
more women involved at all levels of peacebuilding processes, the stronger said processes. The UN officially 
advertises this position, claiming for example that "Women's participation in peace negotiations increases the 
durability and the quality of peace".84 This might be an oversimplification: while "there are suggested correlations 
between the organised participation of women's groups and greater attentiveness to gender in the resulting text 
of the agreement",85 correlation does not imply causation. 
Improving women's participation was long limited to simply increasing the number of women present – counting 
women rather than making women count,86 also known as the tendency to just "add women and stir"87 – at all 
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levels of decision-making, with a particular focus on peacebuilding.88 WPS resolutions appear to consider this 
the solution to the underrepresentation of women in such processes, which is noted with "deep concern".89 The 
resolutions also require the Secretary-General to be an actor of the solution, specifically requiring, in addition 
to the above,90 that they appoint more women in senior positions within the UN, such as special representatives, 
envoys and mediators;91 the inclusion of more women in UN field operations,92 in the security and justice sectors 
at a national level.93 A 2012 study analysed the 31 major peace processes from 1992 to 2011 with available 
data and found that women made up 4% of signatories, 2.4% of chief mediators, 3.7% of witnesses and 9% of 
negotiators.94 The most recent data, from 2017, provided the same statistics,95 thus illustrating the lack of 
progress. This was also acknowledged by WPS itself: S/RES/2242 commented on the Secretary-General's 
"commitment to prioritise the appointment of more women in senior UN leadership positions".96 The inclusion 
of the phrase clearly indicates that the matter was still an issue fifteen years after S/RES/1325. 
There has however been a slow shift, a minima in vernacular, probably linked to the amount of academic 
attention paid to the question, that is worth commending: the focus is now on meaningful participation rather 
than just participation.97 Resolution 2122 marked a step in the right direction. Along with the UNSG's 7-Point 
Action Plan (7-PAP),98 it was "adopted in part as a response to feminist concerns that that the participation pillar 
of women was being neglected in comparison to their protection. Both place emphasis on the importance of 
including women and gender analyses in order to reach a sustainable and inclusive peace."99 It focuses on 
participation in a lot more detail than any of the previous resolutions save for S/RES/1889, but even that focused 
exclusively on women's participation in "all stages of peace processes, particularly in conflict resolution, post-
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conflict planning and peacebuilding".100 S/RES/2122 goes beyond that and provides a much more in-depth 
manner look at the issue, for example listing specific areas in which women's participation should be facilitated 
in conflict or post-conflict situations ("election preparation and political processes, disarmament, demobilisation 
and reintegration programs, security sector and judicial reforms, and wider post-conflict reconstruction 
processes").101 It further marks a turning point as it gives women agency by requiring that they participate, where 
previous resolutions only requested that such processes take the needs of women into account.  To achieve 
this, it encourages Member States to "develop dedicated funding mechanisms to support the work and enhance 
capacities of organisations that support women's leadership development and full participation in all levels of 
decision-making", which is also a new development.102  
S/RES/2122 also goes beyond previous resolutions in encouraging women's "equal and full participation" at all 
decision-making levels.103 Again, the resolution sets out specific requests in order to achieve this. For example, 
it "Requests the Secretary-General's Special Envoys and Special Representatives to United Nations missions, 
from early on in their development, to regularly consult with women's organisation and women leaders, including 
socially and/or economically excluded groups of women".104 This explicit mention of sub-categories within the 
previously monolithic concept of 'women' marks a huge shift. It challenges the representation of women as one 
homogenous group with the same needs and expectations established prior, for example in resolution 1325, 
which "does not address the intersection of gender with other vectors of privilege and marginalisation [e.g.] 
race, ethnicity, sexuality, physical ability and religious privilege, and how this manifests in specific post-conflict 
communities".105 Later resolutions have reiterated the WPS's focus on meaningful participation,106 though not 
in as much detail as S/RES/2122. Unfortunately, we still lack the necessary hindsight to assess whether the 
switch to meaningful participation on paper changes anything in practice.  
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2.2. Women in UN peace operations: one facet of participation 
In 2015, former UNSG Ban Ki-moon described peacekeeping as one the "most persistently challenging [areas] 
for ensuring women's equal and meaningful participation".107 This was not a particularly innovative statement: 
increasing women's participation in peacekeeping operations, especially as military or police personnel, has 
been a concern even prior to the establishment of WPS. A variety of actors, from "women's organisation, civil 
society, feminist scholars, as well as the UN" itself, pushed this agenda on the basis that peacekeeping missions 
with higher percentages of women involved were more successful.108 Provisions included in subsequent WPS 
resolutions reflect this mindset. In addition to requesting the UNSG to "provide Member States training 
guidelines and materials [...] on the importance of involving women in all peacekeeping measures",109 WPS 
specifically "Encourages Member States to deploy greater numbers of female military and police personnel to 
United Nations peacekeeping operations" on three separate occasions.110 In 2015, the language changed to 
include a specific, numerical requirement. S/RES/2242 "calls upon the Secretary-General to initiate, in 
collaboration with Member States, a revised strategy, within existing resources, to double the numbers of 
women in military and police contingents over the next five years".111  
Parallel to WPS developments, DPKO adopted a policy directive on gender equality.112 This document clearly 
links peacekeeping and WPS, calling for the "development of National Action Plans for the Implementation of 
SCR 1325 (2000) on Women Peace and Security" as an element of DPKO policy implementation. The directive 
establishes principles underlying its work for gender equality. Some of these principles seem to be lifted directly 
from WPS, for instance "The principle of inclusiveness, which requires that peacekeepers consult with both 
women and men in post conflict countries in all decisions that affect them [...] The principle of standard-setting, 
which requires that the staffing profile of DPKO and United Nations peacekeeping missions role model our 
institutional commitments to gender balance and the equal participation of women in decision-making".113 The 
mention of institutional commitments can also be understood to refer back to the Beijing Declaration, which 
further proves the above point as it lay the foundation for WPS. All of this provides yet another textual basis in 
favour of the interconnectedness of both frameworks, lending further credence to the possibility of addressing 
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SEA by peacekeepers via WPS. In addition to the directive, DPKO launched a campaign in 2009 -at the same 
time as the UNSC issued the first WPS resolution encouraging States to deploy more women police and military 
personnel- to promote the recruitment of women police officers in peacekeeping and increase their numbers to 
20 percent by 2014.114 
UNSG Guterres further drove, in 2017, a system-wide gender parity strategy that includes a specific focus on 
"field settings, with emphasis within this on peace operations [...] where the gaps in gender balance, as well as 
the challenges in addressing this, are the greatest".115 Per his 2018 Report on WPS, the latest one to date, 
women represented 4 percent and 10 percent of military and police personnel respectively in December 2017.116 
By contrast, women represent over 30 percent of international civilian staff (though only 7 percent of local level 
staff).117 On a more positive note, women also made up 41 percent of heads and deputy heads of DPKO and 
Department of Political Affairs (DPA)-led peace operations, which marked a 13-percentage point increase from 
2017, and the UNSG appointed, for the first time, a woman as head of the DPA.118 However, women only led 3 
of 16 police components in July 2018, and there was a single woman military Force Commander, at the head 
of the UN Truce Supervision Organisation.119 The latest numbers, comparatively speaking, are cause for hope: 
as of 31 July 2019, women make up almost 5 and 15 percent of military and police troops respectively,120 a 
sizeable improvement since the UNSG's latest report.  
Though we can commend the progress made, the number of women peacekeepers, all things considered, 
remains disappointingly low, especially when it comes to senior positions in the field. Per UNSG Guterres' 2018 
report, the "reality in [...] peace operations is that the number of women at all levels has stagnated, and is at 
risk of decreasing in the coming years through the imminent downsizing of several missions".121 Based on his 
analysis, S/RES/2242's goal of doubling the number of women peacekeepers in five years therefore seems 
rather unlikely to be met, even with there still being a year to the target deadline, especially as the UNSC 
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expected this to be done "within existing resources"122 –that is, without putting forward the budget for this 
purpose.  
There are several explanations to these low numbers. First, the lack of women in national forces or 
administrations limits appointment possibilities on the international stage, particularly when it comes to senior 
positions.123 Regarding troops in the field, deployment is the remit of TCCs – despite the goals set and its calls 
to increase the participation of women, the UNSC cannot actually enforce the WPS provisions. It is up to 
Member States to decide to recruit and deploy more women into the military and police, which means that 
"achieving a gender balance in UN peace operations is largely dependent on the national recruitment policies 
of TCCs".124 As it happens, the States with the highest percentages of women in their military and police forces 
are generally the ones who contribute the least troops. This is the case of European and North American States, 
for instance, where women make up between 8 and 20 percent of the military, but they "typically contribute 
more uniformed personnel and civilian staff to NATO, EU, and OSCE missions, rather than UN missions".125 
That said, Ethiopia, Rwanda and Bangladesh, the three major TCCs as of 31 July 2019, have all taken steps 
over the course of the past few years to improve their gender balance: Ethiopia boasted 6.3 percent of female 
representation in 2015, almost double the UN average at the time; Rwanda, in addition to the number of women 
in the army tripling over a decade, set a "target to ensure that at least 30 per cent of their peacekeepers are 
women"; and the "Bangladesh Air Force launched a process to ensure that at least 20 percent of their officers 
are women".126  
Furthermore, although the absence of gender balance within TCCs can be an explanation for the low numbers 
of women in the field, there is no guaranteed correlation between the two. Rather the opposite, in fact: according 
to the 2015 Global Study, "the percentage [of women] in missions is typically lower than the percentage in 
national armed forces".127 Albania (12 percent of women in the armed forces in 2010, 18 percent by 2015, yet 
only 1 to 1.5 percent of the peacekeepers deployed by Albania are women) and India (women make up 4 
percent of national troops, yet only 1.7 percent of troops deployed in peace operations) are good examples of 
this trend,128 which is a result of the prevalence of the "gendered protection" norm,, i.e. "the belief that men 
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excel at protection and that women are in greater need of their protection".129 The gendered norm leads to 
considerations of safety, security, and cultural factors being taken into account when determining whether to 
deploy women, and "prevents TCCs from sending women to the most dangerous countries and therefore 
accounts for variation in deployment patterns of female peacekeepers".130 It would explain why, by 30 December 
2016, women only made up 1.8 percent of the military personnel for MINUSMA,131 considered the "deadliest 
peacekeeping mission in the world".132 It also explains the much higher representation of women in the civilian 
staff of UN peace operations. 
2.3. Participation of women peacekeepers, a gateway to protection 
As already briefly mentioned above, the participation pillar within WPS tends to be not an end in and of itself, 
but rather a means to an end, in particular that of achieving protection; the will to increase the participation of 
women in military and police peacekeeping forces is no exception. WPS resolutions are upfront about the fact 
that "women's protection and participation are inextricably linked":133 "women and children affected by armed 
conflict may feel more secure working with and reporting abuse to women in peacekeeping missions, and that 
the presence of women peacekeepers may encourage local women to participate in the national armed and 
security forces, thereby helping to build a security sector that is accessible and responsive to all, especially 
women";134 "their presence may encourage women from local communities to report acts of sexual violence";135 
most relevant to our analysis, WPS considers the "deployment of a higher percentage of women peacekeepers 
or police" to be a way to "prevent sexual violence against women and girls in conflict and post-conflict 
situations".136 For this reason, it consistently applauds the inclusion of women deployed in military or police 
contingents under the banner of the UN and encourages increasing their numbers.137 
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WPS's provisions in this regard stem directly from the gendered protection norm mentioned in the previous 
section: "The assumed conciliatory attributes of women, including communication skills, empathy, sensitivity 
and approachability, are believed to make female peacekeepers more responsive and sensitive to local 
needs".138 When physically present in tense situations, for example at checkpoints, the presence women 
peacekeepers does "reduce levels of aggression and violence", though this is likely more because "they are 
perceived as less of threat than male peacekeepers" than because their gender makes them inherently less 
confrontational (emphasis added).139 
The UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) makes an excellent case for the argument that women peacekeepers 
encourage participation in the national security sector (though whether this leads to it being accessible and 
responsive to all is another matter entirely). It was "one of the first to incorporate components of the WPS 
agenda in its peacekeeping mandates, and was home to the first all-female formed police units".140 UNMIL 
worked with the Liberian National Police (LNP) to create a national gender policy, setting up a Gender Unit and 
Women and Children's Protection Unit, "helped write a sexual harassment policy for the LNP and provided input 
for the National Rape Law, among other activities. By 2017, the LNP had 18 percent female offices (compared 
with 2 percent in 2005), hundreds of officers trained in SGBV, and the security sector on the whole had seen 
more women in leadership positions than ever before".141  However, as women's groups in Liberia were already 
strong actors prior to UNMIL's deployment,142 one can argue that the environment was conducive to women's 
increased participation in the security sector anyway, that Liberian women were already seeking to be more 
involved. Laying the success of the mission exclusively at UNMIL's feet is too simplistic an approach, as is 
claiming that all-female contingents guarantee the promotion of gender balance.  
WPS' claims that deploying more women peacekeepers reduces the risk of SGBV against women and/or leads 
to higher reporting rates of such acts can be similarly challenged as naive. First of all, there is no empirical 
evidence to back this claim; on the contrary, "numerous studies indicate that locals are more likely to see the 
'uniform' than the gender of the peacekeeper",143 which proves especially problematic if WPS is to address SEA 
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by peacekeepers. When they do see gender, women seem to prefer to discuss issues pertaining to their security 
with male peacekeepers, who are "the symbol of protection"144 – again, the gendered protection norm comes 
into play. Beyond these more conceptual arguments, realities on the ground also challenge the idea that having 
more women peacekeepers will decrease the risk of SGBV and increase reporting:  women peacekeepers, 
once deployed, may have limited interactions with locals due to restrictions, for example "not being able to leave 
the base, not having a vehicle, and being required to travel with men" in the example of UNMIL supra, making 
it difficult for victims to reach out to them in the first place.145 This is not specific to Liberia.146  
Some see women peacekeepers as a solution to the problem of SEA by UN personnel, on the grounds that 
"men behave better when in the presence of women from their own culture".147 DPKO adheres to a version of 
this idea – or did in the past, at the very least, claiming in 2000 that "Women's presence [in peacekeeping 
missions] [...] makes male peacekeepers more reflective and responsible".148 From a feminist standpoint, this 
idea results in a frankly unpleasant conclusion, even without addressing the hierarchy it creates between women 
of the same culture and others, be they local women or women peacekeepers from other States: it essentially 
puts women peacekeepers in charge of policing their male colleagues' actions (in addition to doing their job), 
suggesting that men cannot control themselves and require exterior supervision to behave civilly.149 This is an 
underlying proponent of contemporary rape culture, in which the burden of responsibility tends to be placed on 
victims of SGBV rather than perpetrators. In peacekeeping contexts, requiring this of women peacekeepers 
may "result in additional resentment and discrimination against them", bearing in mind that they are already at 
risk of violence themselves (including SGBV), committed either by local troops, armed groups, or their male 
counterparts.150 Going even further, the presence of women peacekeepers may also increase the risk of 
violence against peacekeepers in general: cultural norms in the places they are deployed to also mean that 
locals may consider women's very presence disrespectful, causing armed groups specifically targeting 
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peacekeepers known to include women in their ranks. This then puts male peacekeepers in charge of protecting 
their female counterparts, once again feeding into the gendered protection norm.151 
Finally, arguably the biggest problem with WPS' rhetoric on women peacekeepers is that it assumes "that the 
simple act of being a woman will transcend the economic, cultural, linguistic and possibly religious, racial or 
other ethnic differences and foster open communication based on a kind of shared global sisterhood".152 
Evidence suggests, however, that despite perceptions of women as "physically, psychologically and emotionally 
less capable of serving on peacekeeping missions in infantry type roles"153 women "tend to fit into the military 
hypermasculine environment rather than change it".154 Military (and police) environments exist in a vacuum that 
breeds a toxic, "dominant masculinity which cannot succeed without reducing women to feminine roles that are 
ascribed inferior status and power",155 and an ensuing culture of silence when it comes to addressing SEA. 
These environments either quash sensitivity and empathy, or the individuals who continue to demonstrate such 
traits. With the vast majority of peacekeeping personnel being pulled directly from such environments, expecting 
a sudden change of mentality simply because individuals are now deployed under the banner of the UN is 
utopian at best, and foolish at worst, especially when it comes to gender issues. UNMIL, the very same mission 
lauded for its accomplishments in furthering gender balance, also showed that "women peacekeepers did not 
display particular empathy to local women simply because [they] were women".156 Other empirical data suggests 
that women, much like men, are not particularly willing to report their male colleagues as this can jeopardise 
their careers, friendships, work environment, etc.,157 further emphasising the point that women peacekeepers 
"do not necessarily join missions with the aim of liberating local women in conflict" in the name of sisterhood.158 
Just like men, "many female peacekeepers aspire to join international forces not to improve gender equality, 
but due to career prospects, attractive income, and other professional benefits",159 which illustrates how 
pervasive gender stereotypes are and how damaging they are at every level. 
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Lastly, one must note that despite the WPS' aspirations for women peacekeepers, they are not provided the 
means to achieve such objectives. The training peacekeepers receive is mostly pure military training (i.e. 
"shooting, assaulting and marching practices"160), despite WPS continuously advocating for UN- and TCC-led 
gender awareness training (both pre- and in-mission) for all peacekeepers since 2000.161 Therefore, even in 
scenarios where female peacekeepers wanted to help, they would likely do so by referring the victim to "the 
medics or psychologists, or the NGOs that handle such issues – this was not their job. They [see] their role 
more in terms of protecting women from sexual violence, than dealing with victims of such violence".162 
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CHAPTER THREE: Addressing sexual exploitation and abuse by peacekeepers via the protection 
pillar 
Here, we will look at the meaning of protection in WPS, how it is defined, and issues with the definition (3.1). 
Two elements of protection under WPS that could be particularly useful in the context of SEA make up the rest 
of this chapter: the development of new roles under WPS (3.2) and the fight for accountability for perpetrators 
of SGBV (3.3). 
3.1. Protection in Women, Peace and Security: general remarks 
Per WPS, parties to the conflict bear the brunt of responsibility for the protection of women and girls in conflict.163  
Outside conflict situations, this responsibility weighs primarily on Member-States (or TCCs specifically),164 
though the UNSG is expected to consult with them and provide the necessary guidelines.165 Protection is 
understood to mean that "Women's and girls' rights are protected in conflict-affected situations".166 S/RES/1325 
calls for, in particular, protection from sexual violence in conflict.167 Of the eight subsequent WPS resolutions, 
four of them focus on this issue specifically: 1820, 1888, 1960 and 2106. For this reason, scholars describe it 
as the dominant pillar of WPS.168  
This focus on women as victims of sexual violence in conflict is one that is limited, and one that feminist scholars 
are critical of for many reasons. First, there is an overrepresentation of women as victims of sexual violence 
which leads to a marginalisation of women's other roles in conflict: fighters, heads of households, perpetrators 
of acts of violence, etc. In line with this, focusing on sexual violence rather than as a facet of gendered violence 
more broadly also results in less attention to other forms of victimhood, for example for combatant women who 
are in need of disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration after the conflict,  or as caretakers for members 
of the parties to the conflict. Furthermore, the focus on such acts occurring in conflict is an issue on its own. 
Indeed, women are also victims of gendered violence, be it sexual or not, in times of peace. In particular, 
violence in peacetime can include the absence of economic, social and cultural rights for women. While conflict 
exacerbates all forms of SGBV, insisting, the way international law has done and continues to do today,169 on 
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SGBV in conflict minimises other occurrences of SGBV and detracts from "normalised and systemic gender 
discrimination".170 
Finally, the focus on women as victims of SGBV also detracts from SGBV against boys and men. While women 
make up the overwhelming majority of the victims of SGBV, which affects 1 in 3 women worldwide,171 men and 
boys are also targeted. For two decades, however, they were mostly left out of the WPS framework despite its 
aim being to mainstream gender perspectives broadly speaking. S/RES/2106 first mentions men and boys in 
its preambulatory clauses as needing to be enlisted "in the effort to combat all forms of violence against women"; 
this is deemed "central to long-term efforts to prevent sexual violence in armed conflict and post-conflict 
situations". It then goes on to mention SGBV as "also affecting men and boys and those secondarily traumatised 
as forced witnesses of sexual violence against family members":172 this was a first step in the right direction, 
though the way the wording lumps male victims of SGBV with secondarily traumatised victims almost suggests 
a hierarchy between them and primarily traumatised female victims. In 2015, S/RES/2242 reiterated the 
"important engagement by men and boys as partners in promoting women's participation in the prevention and 
resolution of armed conflict, peacebuilding and post-conflict situations", but left it at that.173 
Only with S/RES/2467 did WPS properly bring men into the fold of its purview. First, it affirms that "men and 
boys who may have been victims of sexual violence in conflict including in detention settings" are, much like 
women, to "have access to national relief and reparations programmes, as well as health care, psychosocial 
care, safe shelter, livelihood support and legal aid".174 But it then goes into even more detail, this time focusing 
on men and boys as a specific category of victims: "recognises also that men and boys are also targets of 
sexual violence in conflict and post conflict settings, including in the context of detention settings and those 
associated with armed groups; urges Member States to protect victims who are men and boys that offer 
appropriate responses to male survivors and challenge cultural assumptions about male invulnerability to such 
violence; requests further that the monitoring, analysis and reporting on arrangements on conflict-related sexual 
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violence focus more consistently on the gender specific nature of sexual violence in conflict and post-conflict 
situations against all affected populations in all situations of concern, including men and boys".175  
The evolution of language marks a colossal shift, from SGBV being something that only affects women and girls 
and therefore excludes men and boys from WPS, to it affecting men and boys (both directly and indirectly), to 
it affecting men and boys directly and therefore being an issue that needs to be addressed by Member States. 
This shift in language is representative of a broader shift in perspective: with S/RES/2467, WPS goes beyond 
being just about women and finally broadens its scope to actually focus on gender in general, at least when it 
comes to protection. That being said, WPS still lacks clarity when it comes to defining how protection is to be 
achieved. 
3.2. Protection via the development of new roles within Women, Peace and Security 
WPS seems to consider creating offices focusing specifically on SGBV in conflict as one of the main ways to 
achieve protection. In particular, it created the roles of women's protection advisers, and of Special 
Representative to the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict (SRSG-SVC). The UN choosing to 
create these offices, and particularly that of a SRSG on SVC specifically instead of WPS more broadly is 
interesting, as it further drives the point home of an overarching perception of women as victims of SVC 
addressed above, to which WPS is no exception.  
S/RES/1888 (2009) set out the role of SRSG-SVC.176 The first SRSG-SVC, Margot Wallström, was appointed 
in 2010; Zainab Hawa Bagura (2012-2017) and Pramila Patten (2017-present day) succeeded her. The SRSG-
SVC is to "provide coherent and strategic leadership, to work effectively to strengthen existing United Nations 
coordination mechanisms, and to engage in advocacy efforts [...] with governments, [...] all parties to armed 
conflict and civil society, in order to address [...] sexual violence in armed conflict". She also chairs UN Action 
Against Sexual Violence in Conflict (UN Action), an inter-agency network of thirteen UN entities, among which 
DPKO, established in 2007 that pushed for the establishment of the SRSG-SVC in the first place.177 The creation 
of the office of SRSG-SVC was intended to integrate and benefit from UN Action's pre-existing momentum and 
funding. This led to some issues when, for instance, the different SRSGs launched their own initiatives parallel 
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to those already underway without reference to the latter. In the words of Eleanor O'Gorman, "At a minimum 
this created confusion, and diluted energies and resources. In some cases, it undermined the work and remit 
of UN Action by neither acknowledging what existed nor inviting UN Action for shared planning and advice."178 
Further complicating matters, UNGA established the UN Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of 
Women (UN Women) in 2010 entirely outside the remit of WPS. Institutional overlap is thus not only a problem 
between WPS and other frameworks like CaAC as shown before, but also within WPS itself. 
WPS's other suggestion to improve the protection of women and children from SGBV is to provide for the 
appointment of women's protection advisers (WPAs) in UN peacekeeping operations mandates,179 along with 
that of gender advisers (Gas). The language of the resolutions makes unclear whether WPAs are a subset of 
GAs180 or an entirely distinct category, with GAs in charge of "ensuring that gender perspectives are 
mainstreamed into policies, planning and implementation by all mission elements"181 while WPAs focus 
exclusively on protection. The confusion on this point seems to imply that the drafters did not much care for 
continuity, further evidenced by the terms adviser/advisor being used interchangeably from resolution to 
resolution. The absence of coherence on paper makes it difficult to imagine WPS working any better in practice 
on this front. 
Indeed, though commendable, the creation of these offices has had limited effect on the ground. The cases of 
South Sudan and DRC are examples of this. WPAs were first deployed with the UN Mission in South Sudan 
(UNMISS):182 six WPAs were deployed in 2012/2013, followed in 2014 by a Senior WPA (SWPA), whose role 
was to advise the SRSG-SVC on the implementation of the WPS resolutions on CRSV.183 According to 
interviews with UNMISS staff in Juba, the WPAs and SWPA were "poorly integrated in the operationalisation 
and practices of protection", in addition to being understaffed for the work expected of them due to the rest and 
recuperation patterns applicable in South Sudan.184 According to the latest available information, UNMISS is 
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still two WPAs short; its mandate includes the budget for a total of nine WPAS.185 One solution to this problem 
was "closer or more constant interaction with women on the [Protection of Civilian] sites and beyond them [...] 
through engaged personnel from the Relief, Reintegration and Protection Section after Civil Affairs Division",186 
which is yet another illustration of the necessity to better interconnect relevant UN frameworks as a way to better 
practice. 
In DRC, the mandate of MONUSCO required the SRSG-SVC to "identify women's protection advisers among 
[the mission's] gender advisers and human rights protection units".187 This understanding is consistent with 
S/RES/1888's approach to WPAs as a subset of gender advisers, which makes sense as the MONUSCO 
mandate was adopted three months after S/RES/1888. However, MONUSCO diverges from WPS in identifying 
WPAs among the Human Rights Protection Unit as well as GAs. This created a duality of roles: gender WPAs 
were to focus on SGBV and human rights WPAs on CRSV; the former handled "gender mainstreaming, 
awareness raising, and training", the latter "verification of incidents, monitoring and reporting".188 When the first 
MONUSCO WPAs were finally deployed in 2014 (budgetary problems explain this five-year gap), both 
categories of WPA were considered independent parts of a triangle along with a Senior Protection Officer.  
Rather unsurprisingly, this structure "led to tensions on the division of roles and responsibilities among the 
different elements", and particularly confused partners outside the mission.189 Today, all elements have been 
streamlined under the Joint Human Rights Office, which somewhat clarifies matters, though confusion remains. 
Illustrative of this, one finds different information on the number of WPAs deployed in Congo: the numbers range 
from one to five.190 Lack of funding explains the understaffing. By contrast, there are 35 posts in MONUSCO's 
Child Protection unit. 
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Beyond MONUSCO and UNMISS, we know for certain that WPAs are deployed with MINUSCA,191 UNAMID,192 
and MINUSMA.193 In 2015, there were apparently 20 WPAs deployed in these operations,194 with the addition 
of UNOCI.195 It would appear that WPAs may also be made part of political UN missions,196 not exclusively 
peacekeeping ones, as was the case of UNSMIL197 or UNSOM,198 which would slightly increase their overall 
number. Even then, the numbers available are low.  
While it is difficult to extrapolate patterns from so little data, it is possible to emit hypotheses. In light of the above 
analysis, the number of WPAs appears irrelevant so long as their precise mandate is undefined. The UN must 
make clear where WPAs fit in its architecture: within WPS only? Beyond it, and if so under which other 
architectures? What is the relation between WPAs, GAs, the SRSG-SVC, other protection units? Are WPAs a 
standalone category or not? Establishing this would shape WPAs' mission and might enable those already 
deployed to effectively yield more results, without even needing to increase the numbers. That being said, it has 
barely been a decade since WPS created the role of WPA, and only seven years since they were first deployed: 
this can explain the lack of useable data.  
With all of this in mind, the question is now whether this facet of the protection pillar could be used to address 
SEA by peacekeepers. The answer, in this author's perspective, directly ties in to the one given directly above: 
if not better defined strictly within WPS architecture, extending the mandate of WPAs and the SRSG-SVC would 
probably serve no purpose. Merely having more people deal with the issue but under different labels in no shape 
or form guarantees efficiency; if the previously mentioned example of CAR is anything to go by, it may indeed 
end up having the adverse effect of different actors delegating responsibility to address the problem ad 
nauseam, leading to no one actually dealing with the problem. 
                                                          
191 UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Central African Republic. 
192 African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur. 
193 UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Mali. 
194 UN, "Building Capacity of Women's Protection Advisers", https://www.un.int/news/building-capacity-
women%E2%80%99s-protection-advisers, 01 April 2015, accessed 12 August 2019. 
195 UN Operation in Côte d'Ivoire. 
196 Women's International League for Peace and Freedom, "Meeting with Women's Protection Advisers focused on 
implementing the mandate to prevent sexual violence in conflict", https://www.peacewomen.org/resource/meeting-
women%E2%80%99s-protection-advisers-focused-implementing-mandate-prevent-sexual-violence, accessed 12 August 
2019.  
197 UN Support Mission in Libya. 
198 UN Assistance Mission in Somalia. 
39 
 
3.3. Protection via accountability 
Another way to ensure protection is via accountability and the fight against impunity for SGBV. WPS has a 
number of mechanisms institutionalising accountability, chief among which the UN Team of Experts on Rule of 
Law and Sexual Violence in Conflict (ToE)199 and Monitoring, Analysis and Reporting Arrangements (MARA).200 
The Team of Experts "works with the consent and cooperation of host governments, with the aim of fostering 
national ownership and responsibility for addressing [CRSV]" and provides technical support such as protection 
of victims/witnesses, support to criminal investigations and prosecutions, military justice, as well as reparations, 
in the countries it is deployed to.201 MARA on the other hand exists to "ensure the systematic gathering of timely, 
accurate, reliable and objective information on [CRSV]" in order to achieve better advocacy and responses (for 
individual survivors as well as at country level).202 They both technically fall under the purview of the SRSG-
SVC, though (S)WPAs may also be in charge of expediting the establishment of MARA locally, as was the case 
of the SWPA appointed in South Sudan in 2014.203  
Any data gathered by MARA can then contribute to the UNSG's naming and shaming policy, which is another 
element of accountability. Explicitly drawing on a UNSC resolution from the CaAC architecture204 in S/RES/1888 
(2009)205 – once again illustrating the interconnectedness of various UN frameworks – WPS encourages the 
UNSG to include "detailed information on parties to armed conflict that are credibly suspected of committing or 
being responsible for acts of rape or other forms of sexual violence" in annual reports, and to include an annex 
listing the parties responsible for patterns of such behaviours.206 Originally, the list served mostly as an indicator 
of progress,207 but this changed in 2015 to address SEA by peacekeepers. Now, a country repeatedly listed in 
the annex may find itself "prohibited from participating in United Nations peacekeeping operations" until it 
ceases such violations and falls in line with applicable UN regulations.208 If it does not, the sanction, as already 
explained in sections 1.1 and 1.4, is suspension.  
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Another aspect of accountability consists in placing the brunt of responsibility for SEA by peacekeepers squarely 
on TCCs. WPS integrated this into its resolutions following the events in CAR in 2015, urging for the first time 
"police- and troop- contributing countries to [...] conduct swift and thorough investigations of their uniformed 
personnel and, if appropriate, to prosecute".209 TCCs are then to keep the UN informed of any developments.  
WPS further urges these countries to "provide robust pre-deployment training on sexual exploitation and abuse 
and vetting of their peacekeeping personnel" (emphasis added) as a way to address the issue. The choice of 
adjective is uncommon, as is the level of detail WPS provides, which shows how important it considers the 
matter. Prior to 2015, WPS only invited Member States to provide gender-sensitive training to soldiers on "the 
protection, rights and the particular needs of women, as well as on the importance of involving women in all 
peacekeeping and peacebuilding measures [...] as well as HIV/AIDS awareness training:210 this was less with 
the idea of peacekeeping in mind than that of ensuring local troops were equipped to address women's needs. 
This makes S/RES/2242's provisions on peacekeeping all the more exceptional.  
The SEA framework provides a similar requirement of investigation, though it makes it the UN's responsibility. 
The documents that deal with this are the UNSG's 2003 Bulletin, the Zeid Report of 2005, and a 2008 
Comprehensive Strategy on Assistance and Support to Victims.211 The Bulletin puts the Head of Department, 
Office or Mission in charge of addressing allegations of SEA; they are to pass any information of an investigation 
to the Department of Management.212 If the investigation yields proof, the cases may, "upon consultation with 
the Office of Legal Affairs, be referred to national authorities for criminal prosecution".213 From the language of 
the Bulletin, there appears to be no obligation to investigate or to prosecute: this is only a possibility. Another 
problem with UN mission leaders bearing the brunt of responsibility for discipline of individual conduct is that it 
further corroborates the individualised understanding of SEA of 1.4, in that discipline of individual behaviours 
relies on the will of other individuals, and not on an institutional policy. This feeds into the difficulties of effectively 
responding to SEA. 
The Zeid Report of 2005 goes into more detail, making the investigative process of SEA the second of its four 
main areas of concern. The section on this matter, however, opens with the acknowledgement of TCCs' 
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complaint that DPKO's investigative mechanisms do not "emphasise that there must be a presumption that the 
troops investigated have acted properly",214 which rather sets the tone for Prince Zeid's approach in general. 
While he "referred to the need for basic first-aid medical treatment, follow-up support, including social assistance 
and indicated that such support should be coordinated with relief agencies that are able to provide such 
assistance [...], called for a voluntary trust fund to be established to help with financing assistance [and 
underlined the] need to provide basic advice to alleged victims",215 the way in which he framed the response to 
SEA remains narrow. His preference for the expression 'alleged victims'216 over 'victims' creates an unnecessary 
distinction which illustrates this.217  
The 2008 Strategy then essentially reiterates the Zeid Report's mindset and discourse: it differentiates between 
complainants218 and victims,219 and grants them different rights. They are both to benefit from "medical care, 
legal services, support to deal with the psychological and social effects of the experience and immediate 
material care, [...] as necessary" though according to the Strategy complainants should only receive basic 
assistance and support, whereas victims ought to receive additional assistance and support.220  In 2015, the 
UNSG still reflected this mindset in official statements, stating for example that "A single substantiated case of 
sexual exploitation or sexual abuse involving United Nations personnel is one case too many".221 The word 
'substantiated' was not strictly necessary, as precedent has shown that there is no question whether or not 
peacekeepers are responsible for such gross abuses of power, yet it was included anyway: this reflects a 
viewpoint where the first instinct is still to doubt victims' claims. 
The specifics of who is in charge of providing such support are unclear. Per the 2008 Strategy, "Assistance and 
support should be provided through existing services, programmes, and their networks [in the host State]. 
However, where necessary, the United Nations should consider the development of new services [...]".222 
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Despite the latter section, this does not truly provide for the scenario in which "there are no agencies willing or 
able to provide support in the areas where victims (or complainants) are located, or if support services are 
inadequate or too short-lived to address the needs",223 especially with the Zeid Report making funding reliant 
on voluntary contributions only. The lack of obligation to supply financing combined with the provisions' general 
absence of clear requirements questions the ability of the current system to effectively address SEA by 
peacekeepers. Using WPS might be particularly helpful in this regard, as it encourages the strengthening, 
including through financial support, of women's civil society and networks, as well as of national institutions' 
ability to address gendered issues: WPS could thus be used to better ensure that the appropriate structures 
mentioned in the SEA framework exist. 
Much like WPS, the UN's SEA framework considers suspension a solution: however, it only considers the 
suspension of individuals without pay and not that of TCCs from peace operations entirely. This was the case 
of General Babacar Gaye following the allegations in CAR, who was suspended not for committing SEA himself 
but for not holding responsible those under his command.224 While the UN finally acting on this possibility is 
commendable, the fact that it took a decade for it to make use of the provision is a matter for concern. In light 
of this delay, it is this author's opinion that the suspension of TCCs per WPS is unlikely to happen anytime soon, 
if at all, as the UN appears reluctant to act on the matter and cannot, furthermore, afford to lose troops. 
The above analysis shows that despite the UN's claims to operate on the basis of a victim-centred approach, 
the reality is one that is perpetrator-focused. Within the SEA framework in particular, accountability is couched 
in terms of individual behaviour, be it that of the perpetrator or the person in charge of investigating allegations 
of SEA. WPS's focus on TCCs behaviour would allow for a much more systemic approach, hence providing yet 
another reason as to why SEA ought to be viewed through its lens.  
It would also be a way of encouraging the prosecution of individuals whom investigations find to have committed 
SEA. At present, such prosecution is the sole remit of TCCs, and when it occurs it often lacks transparency.225 
The UN cannot force or enforce prosecution (similar to the issue of deployment of female peacekeepers 
illustrated above). In practice, this means that there are no guarantees of peacekeepers facing sanctions, 
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especially once they leave the mission to return home. But the UN is not much better at addressing the issue 
itself: "it rarely turns its personnel over for criminal investigation and prosecution; accused rapists are dealt with 
internally, where they face little more than administrative review by the UN bureaucracy".226 The CAR scandal 
very much brought this to light, though it is not the sole incident of the UN's mishandling of SEA cases.227 The 
UN also never followed up on the Zeid Report's recommendation that it create a permanent professional 
investigative mechanism.228 The UNSG claims that SEA statistics appear to be decreasing, with "54 allegations 
reported in 2018 compared with 62 and 104 reported in 2017and 2016, respectively",229 but in light of all the 
above it is permitted to be sceptical.  
First and foremost, the "statistics are unlikely to paint an accurate picture of the scale and scope of [SEA] given 
the limited manner in which the UN tracks incidents of sexual violence by peacekeepers [...], and the likelihood 
that such incidents are vastly under-reported".230 Scholars further suggest that the decline in SEA statistics may 
be a result of it moving underground.231 Some scholars thus favour the opposite perspective to the UNSG's 
claims and suggest that "the culture of impunity has only become more entrenched as both victims and 
perpetrators have little reason to believe that crimes will be punished in any meaningful way or that effective 
measures will be put in place to prevent future abuses".232  
From the victims' perspective, this is made worse by the fact that they are generally not made aware if/when 
perpetrators do end up facing justice, nor do they receive direct assistance from the UN.233 In March 2016, the 
UNSG established the Victims Trust Fund (VTF) recommended by the Zeid Report with the goal of funding 
specialised services that provide assistance and support to victims (medical care, legal services, psycho-social 
support); "so far, some US$ 2 million are available [...] from voluntary contributions from 19 countries as well as 
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from payments withheld from civilian, military and police personnel against whom sexual exploitation and abuse 
allegations have been substantiated, which amount to approximately US$ 317,000".234 Although UNSG 
Guterres has described this as "an effective remedy" providing "the resources victims need", the VTF "disperses 
the funds as grants to civil society organisations that provide generalised services in a fraction of the affected 
communities in a small number of countries":235 individual victims remain entirely outside the remit of the UN, 
which is "at odds with the [its] institutional obligation to ensure that adequate support and assistance is 
provided".236 
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CHAPTER FOUR: Potential gaps in addressing sexual exploitation and abuse through the lens of 
Women, Peace and Security: the issue of peacekeeper babies 
WPS consistently refers to children throughout its resolutions. These references frame children as direct victims 
of violence, particularly conflict. However, in the context of peacekeeping, children may also be victims in 
another manner: this is the question of children born of SEA. This chapter will address how the UN's SEA 
framework deals with the question in theory (4.1), how theory measures up in practice (4.2), and how WPS 
addresses the matter, if at all (4.3). 
4.1. Peacekeeper babies in the UN's sexual exploitation and abuse framework 
Also known as "peacekeeper babies", they were first brought to international attention with the cases of Liberia, 
and the UN Mission of Support in East Timor (UNMISET) in the early 2000s.237 The UN addressed the question 
as of the Zeid report, thus including it as a subset of SEA almost from the get-go of its zero-tolerance policy. 
Indeed, according to the report, peacekeeper babies are "a consequence of sexual exploitation and abuse, [...] 
fathered and abandoned by peacekeeping personnel".238 The question of the legal avenues available to 
peacekeeper babies and their mothers ties in directly with the way the UN defines SEA: per the 2003 Bulletin, 
"Sexual relationships between United Nations staff and beneficiaries of assistance, since they are based on 
inherently unequal power dynamics, undermine the credibility and integrity of the work of the United Nations",239 
even when these relationships occur between consenting adults, especially when there is no transactional 
element. Expressing a definitive opinion on this particular point does not come easy personally: on the one 
hand, can consent really be given freely when power dynamics are strongly imbalanced, or does that imbalance 
automatically create an exploitative situation where the opportunity to refuse is actually absent? On the other 
hand, however, including these kinds of relationships as well as ones that involve a transactional element under 
the umbrella of SEA completely negates what agency some women may have in the matter, which is 
inconsistent with a feminist approach.240 With peacekeeping missions generally deployed to non-white countries 
and, as a result, the fact that women victims of SEA are generally women of colour, there are also racist 
undertones to this approach, which is doubly problematic if one's feminism aims to be intersectional.  
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The UN's perspective, however, does not bother with such hesitations: all relationships between peacekeepers 
and local women amount to SEA, therefore all babies born of such relationships are peacekeeper babies and 
ought to benefit from the provisions the UN sets out to this effect. 
The Zeid report addresses peacekeeper babies in §72 to 77, which make up the section on financial 
accountability more generally. Peacekeepers are to "bear some financial responsibility for their actions";241 this 
is because "victims and abandoned peacekeeper babies may face stigmatisation by their families and 
communities, which deprive them all support (economic, social, emotional, etc.)", which may further push them 
into an exploitative cycle.242 The report only addresses the cases of "victims who have credible evidence of 
paternity", which are subdivided between those living in a State with a functioning legal system, and those who 
do not. In the former scenario, victims are encouraged to "seek a court order for support". In the latter scenario, 
the UNSG a two-fold role in ensuring that an avenue remains open to victims to obtain support. First, per the 
report, the UNSG ought to help establish the peacekeepers' paternity via a DNA test,243 then, if paternity is 
confirmed, it recommends that the UN deduct a specified amount of the peacekeeper's salary. In cases where 
the identity of the father is unknown, "some assistance could be given from the trust fund for victims".244 The 
UN may also act as an intermediary between victims and TCCs, by assisting the former in making a claim "that 
could be forwarded to [the latter] for consideration".245 
As already established in section 3.3., the UN implemented the Zeid report's recommendations regarding 
victims to some extent in the pre-cited 2008 Comprehensive Strategy, as well as the 2009 SEA Victim 
Assistance Guide.246 These documents do not address peacekeeper babies specifically. However, they 
"establish the UN's commitment to facilitate paternity and child support claims" when combined with the UNSG's 
2019 report on SEA247 and the UN's measures on such claims.248  
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In 2014, DPKO and the Department of Field Support developed a "DNA sample collection protocol" and started 
providing field missions with "DNA paternity collection kits and guidance for their use".249 However, the UN 
makes very clear that it "can refer complainants or victims to legal assistance and can link complainants or 
victims with the appropriate officials in the country where they wish to bring their claim [...], can facilitate the 
collection and transmission of samples for testing" (emphasis added),250 not that it must.  The collection and 
transmission of samples for testing to TCCs only possible "where the national legislation of a Member State 
permits the use of DNA samples for testing for paternity", which adds another hurdle to the proceedings 
available to victims even though Member States have a "duty to facilitate matters relating to paternity claims 
involving military or police personnel".251 The UN appears fully aware of its own limitations on this matter: even 
in cases of established paternity, though the UN "can facilitate the exchange of legal documents to ensure that 
paternity is legally recognised by courts in the countries of both the mother and father and that arrangements 
are made for the payment of child support" (emphasis added), it acknowledges that the "cooperation and active 
engagement of Member States throughout the process is essential".252   
4.2. Addressing the issue of peacekeeper babies in practice 
Despite the established theoretical framework, the UN's help with peacekeeper babies is limited. Liberia, for 
instance, registered around 6000 peacekeeper babies in 2000.253 Liberia is the situation with the best available 
numerical data on the number of registered peacekeeper babies. In Timor, media sources contemporary to the 
scandal put the number of peacekeeper babies at "at least 20".254 At present, it appears that "more than two 
dozen Haitian women" are pursuing paternity claims against peacekeepers,255 among which ten or eleven 
before Haitian courts.256 In 2017, this number put Haiti in second place for most paternity claims per country 
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behind the DRC.257 In CAR, nine girls were left pregnant with peacekeeper babies.258 Lastly, there would appear 
to be peacekeeper babies in Mali259 and South Sudan, though there is no data available. The UNSG's 2019 
SEA report mentions the field victim's rights advocate partnering "with a national non-governmental organisation 
to provide legal assistance to victims, in particular with respect to paternity and child support claims", which is 
the sole reason one can reasonably assume that peacekeeper babies are an issue in South Sudan at all.260 
The lack of official sources makes analysis very difficult. The UN has made no data prior to 2010 available,261 
meaning the sources on the matter are essentially media sources. Though valuable, these sources may provide 
less information than official ones. According to the figures put forth by the UN, there have been 233 paternity 
claims from 2010 to this day, and 9 potential paternity claims. This number was at 111 in June 2017; of these, 
"only 17 claims worldwide [had] been confirmed", which amounts to 15%. Despite thorough research, finding 
more recent data has proved impossible, which is especially frustrating given that the number of claims has 
more than doubled since then and that it would be useful to look at how the trends have evolved, if at all – 
especially in light of how bleak said trends were in 2017 – in order to assess the efficacy of the UN's measures. 
Haiti is probably one of the examples to best serve to illustrate this: it has a decent amount of available data, 
particularly from local NGOs "pursuing child support claims on behalf of victims of SEA":262 these are the Bureau 
des avocats internationaux (BAI), partnered with the Institute for Justice & Democracy in Haiti (IJDH). Haiti also 
benefits from prior media scrutiny, especially in relation to peacekeepers, who are responsible for bringing a 
cholera epidemic to the island in 2010, leading to the death of ten thousand people and eight hundred thousand 
getting infected (about 8% of Haiti's total population).263 
BAI, in August 2016, sent the UN legal notifications "informing the [SRSG to MINUJUSTH,264 the successor to 
MINUSTAH] of its intention to file child support suits", which the UN ignored. BAI reiterated the request in 
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January 2017 and "worked with media to ensure the UN was aware of the cases through press coverage and 
inquires" as well as through formal legal channels. By December 2017, with the UN still unresponsive, "BAI filed 
the claims in Haitian courts with the UN cooperation requested". This is despite the UN having affirmed its 
commitment to help with paternity claims against peacekeepers. In April 2018, the Victims' Rights Advocate 
travelled to Haiti to meet with some of the claimants, a visit the UNSG speaks of in the 2019 report, saying that 
they "worked to ensure more timely communication on outstanding paternity claims, resulting in several victims 
formally receiving long-pending DNA test results".265 BAI and IJDH, however, note that "several of the cases 
remain pending" even to this day, despite the VRA's personal involvement, and that where the UN did provide 
some information, it did so by contacting the victims directly, thus completely bypassing their chosen legal 
representation. Overwhelmingly, the UN has ignored their requests for cooperation, "gravely undermining [the 
victims'] ability to pursue their claims".266 It would seem that the UN has also ignored a direct order from a 
Haitian court which "ordered the [SRSG for MINUJUSTH] to provide the court with all necessary and otherwise 
useful information pertaining to the case of [BAI and IJDH's] client, particularly that which relates to the identity 
of the defendant".267 All of these elements – in particular regarding the court order, should this be further 
corroborated – show that the UN's practice is not at all in line with its discourse when it comes to paternity 
claims. The lack of data on the other countries where peacekeeper babies are an issue reinforces this. 
4.3. Peacekeeper babies and Women, Peace and Security 
Prior to resolution 2467, WPS does not explicitly refer to peacekeeper babies. However, a number of its 
provisions could technically be interpreted to extend to peacekeeper babies. First and foremost, all the WPS 
provisions relevant to accountability and fighting impunity for SEA in general, as exposed in section 3.3, can be 
extended to take the question of peacekeeper babies into account as they are considered to be part of the remit 
of the UN's SEA policy, which WPS does clearly refer to. MARA and the ToE could reasonably easily be asked 
to collect data on and provide assistance to, respectively, peacekeeper babies and their mothers. The naming 
and shaming policy could be used to single out contingents who leave children behind, especially considering 
that the CaAC agenda as well as WPS provides for naming and shaming.268 WPS' requirement that police- and 
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troop-contributing States provide prompt investigations and (where relevant) prosecution for SEA applies to 
peacekeeper babies as well even if they are not mentioned, again because the UN considers them to fall under 
the SEA's framework of reference: ipso facto, they also fall under WPS on this particular point. 
WPS resolutions also implicitly left room for peacekeeper babies in their mandate before 2019 through 
references to the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC).269 In its first mention, the CRC appears to be 
yet another legislative tool guaranteeing the protection of "girls, especially as civilians" in armed conflicts, which 
makes it of less interest.270 However, it is next mentioned much more broadly in the resolutions' preambles, with 
WPS reaffirming or recalling "the obligations of States Parties to [...] the Convention on the Rights of the Child 
and the Optional Protocols thereto, and urging States that have not done so yet to consider ratifying or acceding 
to them".271 As it happens, the CRC grants any child "as far as possible, the right to know and be cared for by 
his or her parents";272 States are expected to help secure this right. Furthermore, it deems the parent(s) to have 
"the primary responsibility to secure, within their abilities and financial capacities, the conditions of living 
necessary for the child's development".273 States must help parents implement this right, which can include 
"material assistance and support programmes, particularly in regard to nutrition, clothing and housing".274 States 
are also "to take all appropriate measures to secure the recovery of maintenance for the child the parents [...], 
both within the State Party and from abroad".275  
How does this affect peacekeeper babies? First, the child's right to know their parents and the State's obligation 
to help achieve this entrenches the access to paternity tests in situations of SEA in the human rights framework. 
The fact that parents, per the CRC, need to secure the children's living conditions then allows for the matter of 
child support for peacekeeper babies to be similarly backed by human rights. It is interesting to note that the 
CRC is a UN treaty; one might expect the UN to better fall in line with its own human rights treaty. Furthermore, 
almost all States save for the United States, Somalia and South Sudan have ratified the CRC.276 Neither Somalia 
nor South Sudan provides any peacekeepers; the US has provided a total of 34 peacekeepers over the course 
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of the history of peacekeeping missions.277 In concreto, this means that most, if not very nearly all, peacekeepers 
responsible for fathering peacekeeper babies are nationals of a State bound by the CRC, making it all the more 
startling that obtaining redress is so complicated. However, the fact that the children were fathered abroad, with 
their fathers deployed under the UN's banner, admittedly throws a spanner in the works and raises questions 
as to the extra-territorial application of the CRC. 
As for more direct references to peacekeeper babies in WPS, there are three of them to be found in resolution 
2467. This is the first explicit acknowledgement in WPS, in almost two decades, of children born as a result of 
CRSV; before this, the perception of children in WPS was limited to direct victims of sexual violence only. 
Resolution 2467 mentions "women and girls who become pregnant as a result of sexual violence in armed 
conflict [...] and their children born as a result of sexual violence, [...] women, girls and children born of sexual 
violence in armed conflict" (emphasis added),278 and "women with children born as a result of sexual violence 
in conflict".279 Such description extends beyond the sole matter of peacekeeper babies; however, the following 
analysis will not look at other understandings of the question. 
With S/RES/2467, WPS recognises the "different specific needs [of women, girls and their children born of 
CRSV], and [...] the connected, distinct, sometimes life threatening and enduring risks and harms often face by 
those women, girls and their children born as a result of sexual violence, including economic and social 
marginalisation, physical and psychological injury, statelessness, discrimination and lack of access to 
reparations".280 WPS's assessment of the risks and harms victims may find themselves facing mirrors the SEA 
framework, which offers a similar reasoning as to why it should address the matter of peacekeeper babies. It 
urges "States to recognise the equal rights of all individuals affected by sexual violence in armed conflict, in 
national legislation, consistent with their obligations under [...] the Convention on the Rights of the Child, as 
applicable, further requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on these issues [...] and 
requests the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Children and Armed Conflict to cooperate with 
the Special Representative on Sexual Violence in Conflict and other relevant UN entities on that matter".281 
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Several things are further worth noting here: first, the inclusion of States' obligations under the CRC in an 
operative clause for the first time clearly makes it one of the applicable frameworks to babies born of CRSV, 
including SEA, as opposed to previous resolutions only implying it; the previous section has shown why and 
how this can strengthen victims' rights. Second, the request that the SRSG-SV and SRSG on CaAC cooperate 
further drives home the connection between the UN's various agendas when it comes to issues that affect 
women and children, as established in chapter one of this analysis, and underlines the importance of addressing 
these issues not as standalones but taking broader, underlying issues such as gender into account. 
Resolution 2467 also affirms that "victims of sexual violence, committed by certain parties to armed conflict, 
including non-State armed groups designated as terrorist groups, should have access to national relief and 
reparations programmes, as well as health care, psychosocial care, safe shelter, livelihood support and legal 
aid and that services should include provisions for women with children born as a result of sexual violence in 
conflict".282 Again, this echoes the SEA framework on the issue of peacekeeper babies in requiring that victims 
have access to relief and reparation programmes. The inclusion of a detailed list of the other services victims 
should benefit from is commendable, especially when contrasted with the SEA framework's rather vague 
requirement of assistance. However, a key problem with WPS's solution lies in the requirement that such 
programmes be national ones. Indeed, the crux of the issue of peacekeeper babies is precisely that those from 
whom victims of SEA seek assistance are not nationals of their own State, which is why obtaining 
acknowledgement of paternity and financial support is so complicated. Therefore, while this author applauds 
the progress made in resolution 2467 when it comes to children born of CRSV, it is regrettable that it cannot be 
used as it stands to strengthen the SEA framework on peacekeeper babies in the same way that such a thing 
was possible on other topics.  
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CONCLUSION 
 
This dissertation aimed to compare WPS and the UN's SEA response framework to determine whether or not 
the former could serve as a background in the use of the latter, in order to guarantee a more comprehensive, 
holistic response to SEA. Although other frameworks, such as the Protection of Civilians or Children and Armed 
Conflict agendas, factored into this analysis, WPS was the main focus, especially its protection and participation 
pillars. The lack of useable data proved to be a recurring problem throughout, no matter which issue or pillar 
was the focus of the chapter. 
Protection under WPS overlaps significantly with the zero tolerance policy, in particular in its requirement that 
impunity for perpetrators of sexual and gender-based violence be challenged. It also goes beyond this, creating 
offices specifically designed to monitor and report such behaviours, something that would not go amiss in the 
SEA framework which at present puts only the Secretary-General in charge of this. Despite some underlying 
issues with the protection pillar, chief among which the gendered protection norm it perpetrates, it nonetheless 
provides for a broader understanding than what the zero tolerance policy proposes, one that analyses sexual 
violence as a gender issue and not just as the result of individual behaviour.  
The results are more mixed as regards participation. Indeed, participation is the lesser pillar even within WPS; 
as regards SEA, participation would essentially be relevant as a gateway to guarantee protection, which, as this 
analysis has shown, is an approach that has its problems. Bringing the participation pillar into the fold of the 
response to SEA would likely only yield results in the long run, which, while a commendable endeavour to strive 
towards regardless, limits its purpose as a solution to the inefficiency of the zero tolerance policy now.  
Lastly, the issue of peacekeeper babies, which is a substantial subset of SEA, is mostly left out of the remit of 
WPS. Through interpretation, a select number of WPS provisions allow for the inclusion of peacekeeper babies 
under its mandate, but overall it does not stand out as the architecture best suited to address this specific matter 
from a more human rights-oriented perspective – though WPS rules on victims' rights could of course apply 
generally to this scenario. The Children and Armed Conflict Agenda may be better suited to the task, though 
detailed analysis would be needed in order to corroborate or reject this hypothesis.  
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In conclusion, WPS is a flawed architecture, both in its own right and as a lens through which to view SEA by 
peacekeepers. However, it has the distinct advantage over the zero tolerance policy of looking at and seeking 
to address gender imbalances which are behind issues like SEA, which makes it a valuable tool irrespective of 
its limitations. The fact that it seeks to be proactive is another advantage; in stark contrast, the SEA framework 
developed post facto in the wake of various scandals that shook confidence in the UN and forced it to act to 
clean up its image, which is far from the best way to ensure the adoption of healthy policies. Finally, as illustrated 
throughout this paper, WPS has seen considerable development in the right direction in a short amount of time. 
One can hope that this is the harbinger of WPS becoming an undeniably feminist tool. Until then, though, there 
is enough within its existing provisions to improve the UN's response to sexual exploitation and abuse, even 
more so if it were to be combined with other explicitly human rights-based frameworks, though how the UN 
would be to go about that raises a host of questions of its own. 
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